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Introduction 
In this article, the sovereign debt crisis, affecting the so called  ‘PIIGS’ 
group (made up of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), is inserted 
within the context of the structural imbalances characterising the EMU from 
the start (Simlarly Krugman 2012; DeGrauwe 2013; Eichengreen 2014). 
The main argument is that the global financial crisis, given the structural 
differences of the different Euro-area members States, hit the different states 
in different ways, de facto acting as an asymmetric shock. This exacerbated 
the structural problem of competitiveness inherent to the way in which the 
European Currency Union was conceived. As such, the sovereign debt crisis 
can hardly be read as merely a fiscal crisis. On the contrary, it was the result 
of an already existing problem of sustainability of a structurally asymmetric 
monetary union made more serious by the economic shock represented by 
the global financial crisis.  
In a way, the Global Financial crisis acted as a catalyst of the already 
existing imbalances embedded in the EMU, signalling to the financial markets 
which countries to speculate against (Chang and Leblond 2015). Speculation 
continued unhindered until when, eventually, the ECB decided, or was 
allowed to act, as a de facto lender of last resort. 
This article is concerned with the above issues starting with addressing 
the unfolding of the Euro-zone crisis and its nature. It will then assess to what 
extent Euro-zone member states faced competitiveness threats exacerbated 
by the outburst of the global crisis. Finally it will focus on the reactions of EU 
Institutions, and, in particular, on the role of the ECB as a “hidden” lender of 
last resort. 
 
The role of the Global Financial crisis 
There is no doubt that the global financial crisis represented a 
substantial blow to the global economy, leading to wide- ranging and long 
lasting consequences. 
In the literature there is a tendency to distinguish five stages in the 
unfolding of the global financial crisis (Orlowski 2008). If the first stage is 
clearly represented by the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market, this 
was followed by a credit crunch leading to a liquidity crisis. The subsequent 
phase was a commodity price bubble and finally the demise of investment 
banking in the US (Orlowski 2008). 
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Although the bail out of financial institutions by national governments all 
over the globe did avoid the global financial meltdown, by that time the global 
financial crisis had already provoked a global economic crisis (Talani 2010). 
Just two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the global economy had 
experienced its sharpest ever decline of the GDP, going from 5.2 per cent to -
0.8 per cent (Sinn 2010:6). 
This was particularly serious in the euro-zone, where the GDP fell by an 
unprecedented 9%, from 3.8% in 2007 to -5.2% in 2009, with Ireland being 
the first euro-zone country to technically enter into recession in September 
2008 (Sinn 2010:6). 
Finally, the Euro-area experienced a sovereign debt crisis starting in 
Greece, in May 2010, moving to Ireland at the end of November 2010, and 
eventually to the other members of the so-called PIIGS group (including 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). 
The first country to be attacked by speculation was Greece in May 2010, 
immediately after Moody’s downgraded its debt1. If this can be considered a 
signal to the markets to start attacking a country (Chang and Leblond 2015), it 
certainly did not help that the reaction of EU institutions took a long time and 
resulted in the mere establishment of an ad hoc European Financial Stability 
Facility. This was a temporary and underfunded initiative, that, instead of 
quashing the markets’ thirst for speculation, might have even excited it 
(DeGrauwe 2013). 
In fact, by November 2010 financial markets were targeting Ireland. The 
country was then still plagued by the crisis of its banking system and, despite 
the fact that the EU had decided to approve a rescue package for €85 billion, 
which included €35 billion to bail out the Irish banking system and € 50 billion 
in support the government’s day-to-day spending, financial markets did not 
seem satisfied. They kept on selling Irish bonds, together with the Greek, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Italian ones, thus substantially increasing the yields 
paid on them2. As the situation worsened, threatening to bring the entire 
system to collapse, on 16th and 17th December, 2010, the European Council, 
amid serious worries for the stability of the entire system, decided to 
institutionalise the European Stability Mechanism, a rescue measure officially 
launched on 8th October 20123. 
Indeed, there was no possibility of mistaking the seriousness of the 
euro-zone situation. A report of the ECB of December 2010 identified in the 
interplay between sovereign debt difficulties and the weakness of the banking 
sectors of some countries a potentially disruptive threat for the sustainability 
of the whole Euro-zone4. 
The assessment of the ECB differentiated between the sources of 
instability for the EMU outside the financial system and risks existing inside it5. 
                                                             
1 See BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8671632.stm as accessed 
on December 22, 2010. See also below this chapter. 
2 See BBC News, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11860879 as accessed on 
December 22, 2010. 
3 See BBC News Q&A: The European Stability Mechanism, available online 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19870747 as accessed on October 9, 2012 
4 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
5 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
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The outside sources of concern were given by macroeconomic imbalances 
between the different member states, which were reflected in the increase in 
unemployment levels and the related reduction of credit to private economic 
actors. This was accompanied by the re-emergence of global imbalances, and 
some residual concerns about the fiscal stances of some of the Euro-zone 
member states. Clearly fiscal concerns were not the only source of troubles 
identified by the ECB at the height of the sovereign debt crisis and 
macroeconomic imbalances both within and without the euro area featured 
extensively among the problems to worry about. Also the risks identified 
inside the financial system included the possibility of more volatility of financial 
markets in the lack of macroeconomic recovery.6 
Indeed, the ECB identified an adverse feedback loop between economic 
recession, the credit crunch and fiscal imbalances, which was at the roots of 
the persistently increasing spread between euro-zone sovereign bond yields7. 
That the problem had shifted from the financial side to the real economy was 
further demonstrated by the fact that in the second and third quarters of 2010, 
the profitability of many euro-zone large and complex banking groups 
(LCBGs) had continued recovering 8 . Final concerns were expressed in 
relation to global financial imbalances that, if emerged again, could create 
new threats to the fiscal and financial positions of some countries within the 
EMU9.  
If the analysis of the ECB was clear enough, the solutions identified by 
EU Institutions did not seem to be able to stop the crisis, to the extent that in 
July 2011 the Greek, Irish and Portuguese spreads with the German Bund hit, 
respectively, 1600, 1200 and 1100 basis points. Equally, the Spanish and 
Italian sovereign debt spreads with the Bund reached 400 basis points, 
Belgium hit 200 basis points and France hit 90 basis points10. 
By 2012 Spain had to accept around 100000 mn Euros as a sort of bail-
out for its banking sector on the verge of bankruptcy and Italy had been so 
heavily attacked by the markets that a rescue operation was avoided only at 
the very last minute11. 
 
Fiscal imbalances inside and outside the Euro-Zone 
The fiscal profligacy of the PIIGS (as referred to in DeGrauwe 2013) has 
been often blamed for the Euro-zone crisis. Regarding this, it is difficult to 
deny that some of the countries affected by the wave of speculation against 
their sovereign debt in 2010/11 had had in the past, and were still having at 
the time, compromised fiscal situations. However it is worth noting that the 
fiscal stimulus and bail-out of the financial system came at a high price also 
                                                             
6 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
7 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
8 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
9 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
10 ECB (2010) Financial Stability Review available online at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.htmlaccessed on December 22, 2010. 
11See Financial Times, June 13th 2012:, available athttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2d42d1e-
b36c-11e1-83a9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xfURTAr3 as accessed on June 13, 2012 
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for the budgets of other countries, which were not singled out by the financial 
markets.  
For example, in 2009 the first Obama administration approved a 
stimulus package of $800 billion, raising the deficit to GDP ratio to 10 per 
cent. Similarly, Japan recorded a 10 per cent deficit to GDP the same year 
and in the UK the deficit to GDP achieved the astounding level of 13 per cent.  
On the other hand, the euro-zone average deficit to GDP was only 6 per 
cent in 2010, lower than its average level of more than 7 per cent in the mid-
1990s 12 . Obviously different countries in the euro-zone had different 
performances of their deficits to GDP. However looking at the countries which 
were eventually interested by the sovereign debt crisis some points needs to 
be noticed. 
First of all, not all countries which were under fire by financial markets 
had been experiencing a bad performance of their deficit to GDP during the 
crisis.  
To start with Greece, in 2010, at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, 
the country had a deficit to GDP, which was only 4.3% above the 6 per cent 
average of the euro-zone. Equally, Portugal and Spain had a deficit to GDP 
just about 3.8% and 3.3% above that average, at 9.8% and 9.3% respectively. 
To be sure, Italy had even achieved a lower than average deficit to GDP 
during the global financial crisis, reporting a figure of 5.4% in 2009 and only 
4.6% in 201013.  
Of course, looking at the performance of the debt to GDP the picture for 
Italy changes. However it is not meaningless to underline that in 1995, when 
Italy was qualifying to enter the EMU in the first round, the debt to GDP ratio 
was a good 49% above the average of the future euro-zone, at 121.5% 
against an average of 72.5%. On the contrary, in 2010 Italy had managed to 
shrink this gap to only 34%14. Still looking at the debt to GDP ratio, in 2010 
Spain was actually faring much better than the average of the euro-zone with 
a debt to GDP ratio of 61.2% much below the euro-zone average of 85.2%. 
Equally, Ireland and Portugal were just above such an average with ratios of 
92.5% and 93.3% respectively15. 
Looking at the general government consolidated debt, it is clear that also 
Germany and the UK had dramatically increased it in the period considered 
and that, in terms of total amounts, Germany’s debt was equal to the Italian 
one. Of course one needs to consider the size of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12See ECB statistics,available at http://www.ecb.int/stats/gov/html/dashboard.en.html as 
accessed on October 9, 2012 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid. 
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Figure 1: General Government consolidated gross debt 
 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
Equally, however, all the above fiscal indicators have to be assessed 
within the context of the unprecedented decline in GDP which by definition, 
even only for pure mathematical reasons, but also for economic and political 
ones, increases the debt and deficit to GDP ratios. Just to be clear, in the 
period between 2007 and 2009, Ireland lost 12.2 % of its real GDP, Greece 
6.5%, Spain 7.2%, Italy 6.8% and Portugal 5.3% (Figure below). 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP loss 2007-2010 
 
Source: EUROSTAT elaboration of the author 
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So if the euro-zone crisis cannot easily be conceptualised as a fiscal 
crisis, what was its true nature? 
 
 
The role of asymmetric shocks 
One might speculate at length, as it indeed is done in the literature 
(Krugman 2012, DeGrauwe 2013,Eichengreen 2014) on what exactly was the 
asymmetric shock that hit the euro-zone on the eve of the sovereign debt 
crisis signalling to the market that the time was ripe to increase the stakes on 
weaker countries credibility. It is however difficult to deny that something 
unforeseeable and difficult to control had indeed happened previous to the 
crisis of the euro-zone. As we highlighted above that was, clearly, the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/08 leading to the ensuing global economic crisis 
of 2009/10 (GEC). It is therefore not unconceivable to hypothesise that indeed 
the element that tilted the already precarious balance of the EMU on the side 
of the crisis might have been precisely represented by the events of 
2008/2009.  In a way, we could consider the GFC and the following GEC as a 
sort of symmetric shock. This, however had different effects in different Euro-
zone countries given the asymmetries existing before the creation of the Euro-
zone which the EMU, instead of reducing, as sometimes forecasted by the 
economists (Artis et al 2011), contributed to exacerbate. 
This interpretation is consistent with a number of contributions, which 
had stressed, at the eve of the establishment of the EMU, how the monetary 
union itself could create more imbalances than it would help to recuperate. 
For example, Frankel and Rose (1998), before the EMU came into place 
noted that extending monetary integration could lead to changes in the 
industrial structures of the countries participating in it. This is something that 
Mundell had identified as a problem to keep a monetary Union (Eichengreen 
2014:4-5). The rationale behind this increase in discrepancies between the 
members of a currency union is that, by increasing inter-industry trade, the 
monetary union might bring more regional specialisation, heightening the 
probability that asymmetric shocks would happen or that a single symmetric 
shock  
An even more relevant source of concern was, however, represented by 
the so-called “Walters critique” (1990), a theory which had already been 
brought into question to explain the crisis of the ERM of the EMS in 1992 
(Talani 2000). This critique posited that, despite the currency union, inflation 
rates would not converge across the members of the EMU. In particular, in the 
periphery of the EU inflation rates “would continue” to be higher than in the 
rest of the EMU. It is important to stress that inflation rates in the so called 
PIIGS countries had indeed always been higher than in the core countries. 
And, according to Walters, they will continue to do so. This point is a vital one 
to counter a very widespread interpretation of the increase in the inflation 
rates of peripheral countries within the EMU as a consequence of the 
overheating of their economies ensuing from the fact that they could enjoy 
lower interest rates. Eichengreen (2014), for example, notices that indeed 
Walters (1990) was right because peripheral countries of the EMU 
experienced spending booms at home, reflected in souring construction 
spending (Ireland, Spain), consumption spending (Portugal) and government 
spending (Greece) because of the fact that borrowing became less expensive 
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(Eichengreen 2014:4-5). Similarly, DeGrauwe (2013:6-7) seems to believe 
that inflation in the PIIGS picked up after the establishment of the EMU, when 
low interest rates enjoyed as a result of a single monetary policy produced an 
unsustainable expansion of the economy. 
In fact, and this is the point, inflation rates of peripheral countries had 
always been above the rest of the Euro-zone ones, especially Germany’s. To 
be sure, harmonised inflation had not increased because of the availability of 
cheaper credit within the EMU. The Walters’ critique, in sum, was not 
activated by the establishment of the EMU. It was already valid before the 
currency union came to existence! 
Looking at the performance of the harmonised inflation rates of the 
PIIGS from 1991 it indeed emerges pretty clearly that they all kept higher 
inflation rates than Germany or even of the average Euro 15 until 2009. This 
dynamic, however, was not a novelty introduced by the EMU, but confirmed a 
reality which already existed before the establishment of the EMU, when 
inflation rates were actually much higher! (See figure below).  
 
Figure-3: Harmonised Inflation rates % Changes 1991-2009, 
PIIGS and Germany 
 
 
Source: OECD on-line database as accessed on January 18, 2016 
 
would have different effects in different regions.  
In the literature (Sinn 2014), it is often claimed that similar structural 
imbalances require “internal devaluation” policies, or supply-side policies to be 
countered, which means increasing competitiveness by reducing labour costs, 
either reducing wages and/or increasing productivity.  
However the analysis of competitiveness below will clarify how the 
inflationary dynamics of the PIIGS were not related in most cases neither to 
the performance of real wages nor to that of productivity.  
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Competitiveness and the Euro-zone crisis 
There is by now a relative consensus in the literature that the Euro-zone crisis 
was a crisis of competitiveness and not a fiscal crisis (Krugman 2012; 
Eichengree 2014, DeGrauwe 2013; Bourgeot 2013) 16 . A crisis of 
competitiveness manifests itself as a current account crisis (Bourgeot 2013), 
and it is indeed undeniable the trade account and the current account balance 
of the of the PIIGS experienced an opposite dynamic to the one of Germany, 
from the start of the EMU up to the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Balance on Current transactions with the rest of the 
world 
 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
Figure5: Net exports of goods and services at current prices 
 
                                                             
16 See also Daniel Gros, External Versus Domestic Debt In The Euro Crisis, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 243, May 2011. 
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Source: AMECO 
 
It remains to be discussed, however, what exactly do we mean by a 
crisis of competitiveness as there are, indeed, various ways to define it and 
they do bring to different conclusions and even policy proposals.  
The most important measure of competitiveness, and the one which is 
often quoted in the literature, is represented by the Unit Labour Costs (ULC). 
The nominal ULC are basically given by the ratio between total wages (which 
are nominal wages) and real GDP. They represent how much it costs on 
average in terms of labour to produce a unit of real GDP. Another way to 
calculate nominal ULC is to divide the average wage (total wages over 
number of employees) for the productivity of one unit of labour (total real GDP 
divided by the total units of labour of a country). 
 
Definitions of Unit Labour Costs 
1. Ratio between total nominal wages and real GDP 
2. Ratio between average wage (total wages over number of 
employees) for the productivity of one unit of labour (total real GDP 
divided by the total units of labour of a country). 
 
 
Given the definition of ULC above it is clear that, although it is true that a 
country’s competitiveness might have been affected by an increase in nominal 
wages, those are, indeed also a function of the inflation rates. Furthermore, a 
loss of competitiveness can also be the consequence of a decrease in a 
country’s productivity. Summing up, to correctly assess the factors 
contributing to a fall in competitiveness, one needs to consider the following 
indicators: harmonised inflation rates, real costs of labour and productivity 
levels.  
A study by Bourgeot (2013) clearly shows that the divergences in 
nominal ULCs within the EMU were not a consequence of a wage drift, but of 
divergences in inflation rates and productivity levels. 
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Indeed, looking at real unit labour costs, the wage share of GDP 
experienced a notable decline in peripheral countries between 1999 and 
2007, with Spain decreasing by around 7%, almost as much as Germany’s 
8% after the implementation of Agenda 2010 by Shroeder in 200317. It is also 
worth noting that the PIIGS, apart from Spain and Portugal, have always had, 
before, during and after the euro-zone crisis, a wage share of GDP below 
both the EU average and the average of the Euro zone and also below 
Germany. Even Ireland, which experienced sharp increase of real wages 
between 2002 and 2008, always kept much below EU and Euro-zone average 
and below Germany. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Adjusted wage share 
 
 
Source: The European Commission's Ameco online database (data 
retrieved in January2016 
 
 
                                                             
17 In real terms ULCs represent the ratio between total real wage bill and real GDP (or as an 
equivalent the nominal wage bill and the nominal GDP). Real labour unit costs can therefore 
be expressed as a share of GDP and not just as variations or as an index number (unlike 
nominal ULCs). Likewise it can be calculated as the ratio between the average real 
compensation and real productivity. 
Their variations result from the development of real wages and of real productivity (and 
exclude inflation).  (Bourgeot 2013) 
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Bourgeot (2013) also notices passim that the share of wages has 
generally declined worldwide in the last forty years because of the falling 
power of trade unions and the impact of globalization, whereas the share of 
profits has generally increased for the same reasons (Bourgeot 2013).  
So the explanation behind the increase in the Nominal Unit Labour costs 
needs to be related to the dynamic of inflation rates, which clearly diverged 
already before the establishment of the EMU. Looking at national consumer 
price index (CPI), the effects of inflation on the competitiveness of the Euro-
zone periphery are undeniable. 
Considering the performance of Nominal Unit Labour Costs, real ULCs, 
labour productivity and the CPI for each of the countries interested by the 
sovereign debt crisis and for Germany, the role played by inflation on the 
crisis of competitiveness emerges clearly. In particular in Italy real ULCs have 
remained basically stable for all of the EMU period, productivity followed more 
or less the same trend and this means that the loss of competitiveness can be 
explained exclusively by the role played by inflation. The same dynamic is 
clearly recognisable in the case of Greece and even more in the case of 
Spain, where actually the increase in NULCs and the performance of the CPI 
coincide. A bit different is the situation in Ireland and Portugal, where the 
trend is similar but it is possible to notice also a marked increase in labour 
productivity that kept the RULCs lower. Indeed, a worsening productivity 
would exacerbate the loss of competitiveness by increasing real ULCs, 
whereas an increase in productivity would decrease real ULCs (Bourgeot 
2013). In contrast, in Germany, NULCs do not seem to have been particularly 
influenced by the performance of the CPI, which, although increasing, was still 
far below the CPI of the periphery and therefore it allowed gains in 
competitiveness with respect to them. 
 
 
Figure 7: Italy: NULC breakdown 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO 
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Figure 8: Germany: NULC breakdown 
  
 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Portugal: NULC breakdown 
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Source: AMECO 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Spain: NULC breakdown 
 
 
Source: Ameco 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Greece: NULC breakdown 
 
 
Source: AMECO 
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Figure 12: Ireland: NULC breakdown 
 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
Bourgeot (2013) calculates that it is in the manufacturing sector, the 
most relevant in terms of competitiveness, where these trends have been 
particularly striking.  
Concluding we need to re-assess this whole question of diverging 
competitiveness, resulting mainly from divergent inflation performances within 
the context of the currency Union. As indeed Walters (1990) had rightly noted 
for the ERM of the EMS, in a fixed exchange rate system and, even more so, 
in a currency union, the competitiveness lost because of increasing rates of 
inflation leads, automatically to divergences in the real exchange rates. It 
must be noted, however, that in the EMU, exactly as in the ERM of the EMS, 
real exchange rate would not diverge randomly, but would follow the so called 
‘n-1’ country problem. To this, and to the special position of Germany in the 
EMU, we turn in the next section of this article. 
 
Germany and competitiveness 
In the literature about the relation between the Global financial crisis and 
Euro-zone crisis two questions seem to be particularly puzzling18: 
                                                             
18 See Manganelli, S. and Wolswijk,G.  (2009),“What drives spreads in the euro area 
government bond market?”,Economic Policy, 24: 191-240.Arghyrou, M.G. and Kontonikas, 
A., (2010)The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion,.Cardiff 
Economics Working Paper, N. E2010/9. See also Monfort, A., and Renne, J.-P., 
(2011)Creditand liquidity risks in eurozone sovereign yield curves.Paris: Banque de France 
Working Papers Series, n. 352.Haugh, D., Ollivaud, P., D. Turner, (2009) What drives 
sovereign risk premiums? An analysis of recent evidence from the eurozone..Paris: OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, N. 718. Gerlach, S., Schulz, A. and G.B. 
Wol(2010).Banking and sovereign risk in the euro area..CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 
7833.Attinasi, M.G., Checherita, C., and C. Nickel, (2009).What explains the surge in euro 
area sovereign spreads during the financial crisis of 2007-09?.ECB Working Paper Series, n. 
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The first question is to what extent the financial markets increased the 
returns they required on sovereign debt because of larger fiscal deficits and 
debt or because they changed their attitude towards the pricing of government 
credit risk. 
The second question, following from the first, is to what extent increased 
premiums on risk were the consequence of more risk aversion. 
It is indeed evident, as a study conducted by the ECB shows, that 
financial markets attributed much more importance than before to fiscal 
imbalances following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
More precisely, markets asked coefficients for debt differentials and for deficit 
ones, respectively 7-8 and 3-4 times higher after the GFC than before.19. 
This means that the markets changed their attitude towards countries 
with high fiscal imbalances after the crisis and they did so massively, thus 
demonstrating that there was a clear link between the GFC and the sovereign 
debt one. Also, increased spreads did not only show the lack of credibility of 
the government under fire, but also the desire by the markets to put their 
investment on more secure assets (similarly Krugman 2012). Risk aversion 
was indeed very sensible in a period in which the stock exchange had 
collapsed, the housing market was devastated, and the banking sector had 
just experienced a severe liquidity crisis. In similar circumstances investors 
were looking for safe havens. These were firstly and fore-mostly represented 
by commodities, such as gold and oil, to the extent that scholars recognise 
the commodity price bubble as one of the five phases of the GFC20. However, 
a safe havens investment status was also attributed to the US Treasury 
Bonds and German euro-denominated ones.   
Thus, both increased premiums on fiscal imbalances and increased risk 
aversion account for much of the increase in the spreads of all EU countries 
treasury bonds with respect to US and German benchmarks21. 
If it might be puzzling that the markets had attributed the status of 
investment safe haven to US government bonds, given that the GFC had 
started there and that the country was experiencing a huge increase in its 
debt and deficit to GDP ratios, in the case of the German the reasons are 
much more understandable.  
Indeed, as DeGrauwe (1996:27) had rightly pointed out from before the 
start of the EMU, Germany had enjoyed, in the course of the whole evolution 
of the European monetary integration process, a very privileged position.  
Germany was, and had already been in the past, the one country of the 
‘n-1’ problem. In other words, precisely because of its anti-inflationary 
credentials, Germany had been able to set the monetary policy of all the other 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1131. Barrios, S., Iversen, P., Lewandowska, M. and R. Setzer, (2009)Determinants of intra-
eurozone government bond spreads during the financial crisis.Brussels: European 
Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Papers, N. 
388. 
19 Manganelli, S. and G. Wolswijk, (2009)“What drives spreads in the euro area government 
bond market?”.Economic Policy, 24: 191-240. 
20 Orlowski, L.T., (2008). Stages of the 2007/2008 GlobalFinancialCrisis: Is There a 
Wandering Asset-Price Bubble?, Economics Discussion Papers, No 2008-43. 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-43as accessed on May 
18, 2009. 
21 Manganelli, S. and G. Wolswijk, (2009)“What drives spreads in the euro area government 
bond market?”.Economic Policy, 24: 191-240. 
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members of the currency agreement (DeGrauwe 1996:27). To be more 
precise, in a fixed exchange rate system, like the ERM of the EMS, there are 
‘n-1’ countries, the more inflationary prone ones and, therefore, the ones with 
the weaker currencies, which will have to use their monetary policy to keep 
their bilateral exchange rates fixed. On the contrary, one country, the one with 
the strongest currency, Germany in this case, does not have to worry about 
the exchange rate, and is free to set its monetary policy independently of 
exchange rate constraints. Indeed, in the ERM of the EMS all currencies 
would be depreciated vis-à-vis the DM and therefore, their Central Banks  had 
to ask for very short term lending facilities (VSTLFs) to the Bundesbank and in 
DM to be able to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to support their 
bilateral exchange rate. Germany, because of the strength of its DM, was 
always on the upper band of the system and the BB would de facto provide 
liquidity to the whole system thus defining the monetary policy for all other 
members. 
Moreover, by needing to keep the nominal exchange rate at a level 
which is not consistent with the performance of their inflation, the n-1 
countries is constantly losing competitiveness. Quite to the contrary, the “one” 
country improves its competitive stance as it is able to keep the exchange rate 
at a lower level than the one that would be set if the exchange rate system 
was flexible. The loss of competitiveness of the ‘n-1’countries becomes 
eventually unsustainable up to the point at which their exchange rate peg 
loses credibility and the markets can successfully speculate against their 
currencies. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, divergent inflation rates, 
already existing before the establishment of the EMU, did not disappear after 
the currency union entered into force. In particular, all countries were 
experiencing inflation rates higher than Germany, exactly as it had been the 
case within the ERM of the EMS. That can only mean that all countries within 
the EMU were losing competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany which, by entering 
the currency union could enjoy a less appreciated currency indefinitely, or at 
least as long as its inflation performance was better than the rest of the Euro-
zone. 
Indeed, joining the EMU meant, for the ‘n-1’, more inflationary countries, 
progressively increasing their prices at exports without ever being able to 
devalue the exchange rate. This was particularly serious for the PIIGS which, 
being particularly inflationary prone, had recurred very often to competitive 
devaluations in the past. On the opposite side of the spectrum Germany, the 
’one’ country of the n-1 problem, would progressively and constantly increase 
its competitiveness not only because of a progressively depreciating currency, 
but also because it would not have to face competitive devaluations by the 
other members of the EMU ever again.  
Thus, the imbalances which had characterised the previous attempts at 
monetary integration in Europe were not only reproduced but also 
exacerbated by the currency Union as established at Maastricht which was 
therefore characterised by structural asymmetries from the start. This dynamic 
is reflected in the performance of the power purchasing parity real exchange 
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rate (RER)22  of the PIIGS in relation to Germany based on the average 
consumer price index from 2000–2012 (Figure below). Overall, on the basis of 
these data, Italy lost some 20% of its competitiveness at exports in the course 
of its permanence in the EMU, and even higher losses were experienced by 
Greece and Spain. 
 
Figure 13: PIIGS Real Exchange Rates: 2000-2012 
 
Source: IMF, WEO-elaboration of the author 
 
 
 
Overall, Germany, by entering the EMU acquired a structural bonus of 
competitiveness, which increased progressively and might well have been 
one of the main reasons behind the German decision to give up the DM23. On 
the other hand, the rest of the Euro-zone countries, especially the more 
inflationary ones, lost competitiveness and were unable to regain it by 
reverting to competitive devaluations (Similarly Hall 2012; Scharpf 2013).  Of 
course, there is an on-going debate in the field on whether exchange rate 
devaluations can be considered an optimal way to achieve competitiveness 
                                                             
22 The formula for the RER used here is given by: RER = e (P*/P), where e is the nominal 
exchange rate (1 in the case of the euro-zone), P* stands for the international prices index (in 
this particular case, German prices) and P is national price index. The data was obtained 
from the World Economic Outlook Database of September 2011, available on the IMF’s 
website http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx. Inflation is 
computed with the average consumer inflation index for all countries. See 
http://econapproach.blogspot.it/2011/11/real-exchange-rates-and-eurozone-issues.html as 
accessed on December 27, 2012. For a similar analysis see European Commission, 
Economic and Financial Affairs (2012), Price and Cost Competitiveness, 1-2/2012, Brussels: 
EC, web-site: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pcqr/2012/pdf/pccr_1_2_2012_en.pdf, as 
accessed on December 27, 2012. 
23 Talani, L.S., (2009), The future of EMU, London: Palgrave; Eichengreen, B. and Frieden, J. 
(1994) The political Economy of European Monetary Union, Boulder: Westview Press; 
Frieden, J. (1991) “Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of 
global finance”, International Organization, 45:4, pp. 425-451; Frieden, J. (1994) The impact of 
goods and capital market integration on European monetary politics, Preliminary version, 
August; Frieden, J. (1998) The new political economy of EMU, Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield; Moravcsik, A., (1998) The choice for Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
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(Malbett and Schelkle 2015). More emphasis is often placed on ‘internal 
devaluations’, which means increasing competitiveness by reducing labour 
costs, either reducing wages and/or increasing productivity. On similar 
grounds both EU institutions have often proposed as a solution to problems of 
growth and employment the increase of labour market flexibility, in all its 
dimensions. This characteristically means reducing the power of trade unions, 
as trade unions have historically and institutionally represented the working 
class in its fight for more job security and higher wages. Thus, simplistically, 
the rigidities of the labour markets have been equated to the strength of the 
trade unions and, in turn, this had to diminish in order to resolve the problems 
of competitiveness of the weaker countries of the system, problems that, as 
we have just seen, were, instead, structurally embedded in the EMU. 
It remains to discuss why, if real wages dynamics do not justify 
increases in the inflation rates, and productivity performances were not so 
disastrous in the periphery of the euro-zone, those countries were still 
experiencing higher prices. One suggestion might be that increases in prices 
unrelated to decreases of productivity or increases of real wages could be the 
outcome of a process of catching up which, in a way was not only foreseeable 
but had even been greeted by European Institutions as one of the main 
advantages of a monetary union (EC 1990). 
Whatever the reasons behind such competitiveness gaps, the reality is 
that they clearly existed. This precarious equilibrium held until when the 
markets, with the GFC and the following GEC, realised that the situation was 
unsustainable.  
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010) argue that the performance of the 
spreads in the course of the global financial crisis was due to both an 
international risk factor, measured by the US Stock Market Implied Volatility 
(VIX) and a country specific macro factor represented by the loss of 
international competitiveness.  
In other words, both effects were at play: on one side investors wanted 
safe havens because of the increased risk following from the Global crises. 
On the other hand, the fundamentals of some countries, both macroeconomic 
and fiscal ones, that could still be considered acceptable in times of growth, in 
a more risky environment led the markets to believe that betting against the 
weakest countries of the system was safe. In the lack of currencies, they 
started selling the government bonds of the weaker countries dramatically 
increasing their spreads24.  
Similarly, Chang and Leblond consider the attack to the sovereign debt 
of 2010/11 as a speculation by financial markets. However they seem to 
believe that: 
 
The speculation from early 2010 onward reflects not only the 
varying economic fundamentals of individual eurozone member states 
but also, and more importantly, the growing concern for the integrity of 
the euro area itself. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s July 2012 ‘whatever it 
takes’ pledge to save the euro area ultimately calmed bond investors 
                                                             
24 Arghyrou, M.G. and A. Kontonikas, (2010)The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, 
expectations and contagion.Cardiff Economics Working Paper, N. E2010/9 
Monfort, A., and J.-P.Renne, (2011)Credit and liquidity risks in eurozone sovereign yield 
curves,Paris: Banque de France Working Papers Series, n. 352. 
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down in a way that bailouts and the conditionality programmes that 
accompanied them had not managed to do. Markets sought a large-
scale multilateral solution coming from the euro area rather than a 
unilateral one coming primarily from the debtor countries. Market 
confidence in the euro area has therefore always rested to a large extent 
on the expectation of its solidarity. (Chang and Leblond 2014:628) 
 
This interpretation of the motivations behind speculation is untenable 
because, if the problem was mainly the integrity of the Euro-area, then not 
only the weakest countries should have been attacked. Also, the reason why 
the market stopped speculating after the intervention of Draghi in July 2012 is 
not so much because it signalled to the markets the existence of a euro-zone 
wide solidarity. It was simply because speculation is impossible if there is a 
lender of last resort, although imperfect, that basically buys whatever the 
markets sell. If the ECB buys “whatever it takes”, prices of sovereign debt 
cannot go down and, therefore, interest rates cannot increase (similarly 
DeGrauwe 2013). 
Summing up, more than a shelter against the worst consequences of the 
global financial and economic crisis, the EMU, as designed at Maastricht and 
implemented in the following years proved a highly asymmetric arrangement. 
It signalled to the markets which countries were unlikely to sustain the 
economic shock, thus unleashing a run on their sovereign debt.  
In the next section we will tackle the question of the reaction of EU 
institutions to the sovereign debt crisis and why some policies failed while 
some others, mainly only the monetary policy making of the ECB, succeeded 
in stopping the markets. 
 
Institutional reactions and the issue of the “Lender of last resort” 
As noted above, the n-1 problem, already plaguing the precursor of the 
EMU, was exacerbated by the loss of monetary policy sovereignty intrinsic in 
the establishment of a currency union. In a nutshell, if before the adoption of a 
single currency and a single monetary policy, the n-1 countries of the system 
could rely on stricter monetary policies than the one country or to 
straightforward devaluation of their currencies to resolve their competitiveness 
problem arising from higher inflation rates, with entry in the EMU none of 
those two tools would be available any longer. 
With respect to monetary policy however, although it is true that 
diverging economic realities do need different monetary policies and that a 
“one size fits all” might not be enough, it is also true that even a common 
central bank can, if allowed, effectively intervene to stop financial markets 
from speculating against the member states of the currency Union (Krugman 
2012). 
DeGrauwe (2013) rightly pointed out how central banks are essential 
lenders of last resort to both governments and private financial institutions. 
Indeed, looking at the case of the UK, a sovereign debt crisis could have 
never happened because, if the markets had started to sell British bonds, the 
Bank of England could have always intervened to buy them. This is 
unfortunately not the case as yet in the Euro-area, so that one of the vital 
functions of a central bank had to be performed in a “hidden” or disguised way 
and, crucially, far too late (Krugman 2012). 
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Unfortunately, indeed, before Draghi was given the all clear to do 
“whatever it takes” to save the Euro area (Moravscik 2012), a lot of damage 
had already been done, and some of it by the EU institutions, which had 
focused exclusively on the euro-zone crisis as a fiscal crisis and had taken the 
related fiscal austerity measures to resolve it. 
Indeed, the fiscal decisions taken by EU institutions in the wake of the 
Euro-zone crisis do not configure by any means the establishment of any real 
fiscal union for the euro-area, contrary to some re-emerging neo-functionalist 
interpretation25. They represent, at best an enhancement of conditional fiscal 
co-ordination, if not the imposition of fiscal austerity. The first step to react to 
the massive sale of the PIIGS’ debt financial markets was an ad hoc solution 
lacking institutional depth and democratic legitimacy: the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF)26. Its institutionalisation in the form of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM)27 was then approved in December 2010. 
On the 9thMay, 2010, at the start of the speculation against the Greek 
sovereign debt, the ECOFIN Council deliberated on the establishment of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The total endowment of the Fund 
to rescue euro-zone countries in crisis was a mere €750 billion. To assess 
how small this amount is, it is worth comparing it to the daily turnover of the 
London FOREX, which is around US$5.3 trillion per day28.  
The EFSF was given the possibility to issue bonds guaranteed by Euro 
Area Member States (EAMS) for up to €440 billion for on-lending to EAMS in 
difficulty. The lending was, however, heavily conditional to implementing hard 
austerity programmes negotiated with the (in)famous “troika” of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
and to be approved by the EUROGROUP. The bonds issued by EFSF were 
awarded triple A credit rating by the usual, influential institutions of Standard & 
Poor’s, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s. However, the EFSF was a temporary 
arrangement and, as it failed to limit the run on the sovereign debt of the 
periphery, 29  in December 2010 the European Council opted for the 
deliberation of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This took 
two years to be ratified and was finally inaugurated in October 201230. The 
EFSF was then phased out once the ESM entered into force. The role of the 
ESM was indeed very similar to the one of the EFSF, namely to provide 
conditional support to members of the Euro-zone in financial strains. It is 
                                                             
25 Schelkle, W. (2013) ‘Monetary integration in crisis: how well do existing theories explain 
the predicament of EMU?’. Transfer, 19 (1): pp. 37-48.; Schimmelfennig, F. (2014) 
‘European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism’, Journal of 
European Integration, 36 (3), pp. 321-337; Schweiger, C. (2014) ‘The EU-25 Fiscal 
Compact: Differentiated Spillover Effects under Crisis Conditions’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 15(3), PP. 293-304. 
 
26 See http://www.efsf.Europa.eu/about/index.htm as accessed on December 15, 2010 
27 For more details, see 
http://www.consilium.Europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf, as 
accessed on December 21, 2010. 
28 - See more at: http://www.cityindex.co.uk/forex-trading/what-is-forex-
trading.aspx#sthash.fSDJJL6w.dpuf as accessed on January 20, 2016 
29 See http://www.efsf.Europa.eu/about/index.htm as accessed on December 15, 2010 
30 The ESM Treaty entered into force on 27th September 2012. All seventeen euro area 
member states had ratified by 3rd October 2012. 
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funded by the issuance of money market instruments and medium and long-
term debt with maturities of up to 30 years. The EAMS, in turn, guarantee 
these assets with capital provided in accordance with the contribution key 
annexed to the ESM Treaty31. The decisions about whether and under which 
conditions the ESM can intervene to support a country in crisis has to be 
taken in co-operation with the International Monetary Fund, and EAMS asking 
financial help to the ESM are requested to address also the IMF32. This is 
already a sign of the limited potential of this mechanism in a situation of 
serious crisis and indeed scholars have questioned the extent to which a 
similar mechanism could be effective in rescuing a big member state such as 
Italy or Spain (DeGrauwe 2012).  
Even more clearly in the direction of implementing a strict austerity 
programme allegedly in response to the euro-zone crisis was the approval by 
the European Council, on the 2ndMarch, 2012 of the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact 
(officially the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance TSCG33). By 
signing it, governments committed themselves to enshrine the rule of a 
balanced government budget or in surplus in their own Constitutions. In case 
of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the 
adjustment path towards it, the correction mechanism shall be triggered 
automatically34.  
The fiscal compact, therefore, cannot be confused with a real fiscal 
union, not only because the UK refused to sign it to preserve the interests of 
the City of London as publicly declared by its PM David Cameron. But also, 
and most importantly, because it does not include any solidarity mechanism, 
any increase in the common EU budget nor any feature of a true federal 
budget effectively performing a redistributive and stabilisation function (Ackrill 
2000)35. In practice, the Fiscal compact is just an even stricter Stability and 
Growth Pact which had already been toughened by the six pack reform of 
2011, constitutionally committing the EAMS signing it to austerity and fiscal 
restraint.  
Moreover the pact does not include any reference to solidarity 
mechanisms to be activated in case of a serious crisis of one of the euro-area 
member states. Although on the 22 of June 2015 there has been a joint 
declaration of the five Presidents of the EU in favour of further steps being 
taken in terms of integration of the euro-area, including the establishment of a 
EU Treasury, these will have to be realised by 202536 and in the meantime 
EU institutions can easily change idea37.  
                                                             
31See ESM website, available athttp://www.esm.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
As accessed on October 12, 2012 
32See ESM website, available athttp://www.esm.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
As accessed on October 12, 2012 
33 For the full text see http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf 
34 Full text available at http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf, accessed October 18th 2012 
35 De Grauwe, P., (2012), Interview available at 
:http://aregan.wordpress.com/2012/03/20/interview-with-paul-de-grauw/,accessed on October 
18, 2012 
36 See EU web-site http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5240_en.htm 
as accessed on October 22, 2015 
37 Van Rompuy, H., Barroso, J., Juncker, J-C., and Draghi, M. (2012) ‘Towards a Genuine 
and Economic Monetary Union’, European Counil,  Brussels, 26 June 2012 EUCO 120/12. 
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After this excursus on the mechanisms put in place by the EU 
Institutions to react to the sovereign debt crisis, it should not surprise that the 
only effective policy able to stop speculation against the periphery of the Euro-
area PIIGS could be the European Central Bank acting as a hidden lender of 
last resort and an open “saver” of last resort. As already noticed above, this 
kind of intervention by the ECB has been advocated widely in the literature 
(Krugman 2012, DeGrauwe 2013; Eichengreen 2014) 38 .  Unfortunately, 
however, the European Central Bank is still far from becoming the official 
‘lender of last resort’ of the euro area, as would be natural in any currency 
union. 
Despite this, already in September 2008, with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, the ECB had started intervening by adopting a ‘non-conventional’ 
monetary policy alongside its standard measures. The non-standard approach 
to monetary policy inaugurated by Trichet immediately after the GFC became 
evident, relied initially on two programs: the ‘enhanced credit support (ECS)’ 
and ‘securities markets program (SMP)’. The first program includes two 
elements: (a) increasing the share of liquidity supplied at its long-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs) relative to its regular main refinancing 
operations (MROs); and (b) increasing the maturity structure of its LTROs. 
The most important characteristic of this novel approach to monetary policy 
making is that ECB would provide re-financings on a ‘fixed-rate full allotment’ 
basis, and not on a variable rate tender format as before. To be clear, this 
means that, contrary to what happened in normal times, all financial 
institutions could obtain all the liquidity they wanted at a fixed, and incredibly 
low, interest rates. In addition, the ECB would accept toxic assets (such as 
mortgage-backed securities) as collateral in its refinancing operations. Finally, 
the number of financial institutions eligible to be refinanced by the Eurosystem 
increased from 140 to around 2000 and they were also protected by 
anonymity ostensibly to avoid domino effects39. 
Since 2008, there have been two liquidity providing long-term re-
financing operations in Euro with a three year maturity, one maturing on 29 
January 2015 and one on 26 February 2015, together with US dollar liquidity 
providing operations. Similar operations were very interesting for the banking 
sector as they allowed it to borrow liquidity from the ECB at a very low interest 
rate and use the money to buy the sovereign debt of struggling countries 
bearing much higher interest rates, thus profiting from the difference. The 
consequences of this practice was on the one hand, that a lot of the sovereign 
debt of the countries in crisis ended up in the balance sheet of the banks, 
especially of the stronger member states. On the other hand, the banks had 
no incentive in financing the non-financial private sector, thus exacerbating 
the length and scope of the recession. For this reason, in June 2014 the EC 
announced a series of still on-going in 2016 Targeted Longer term refinancing 
                                                             
38 Giannone , D., Lenza, Michele, Pill, Huwand Reichlin, Lucrezia (2011), Non-Standard 
Monetary Policy Measures And Monetary Developments, Brussels: ECB Working Paper 
Series No 1290 
39 Giannone , D., Lenza, Michele, Pill, Huwand Reichlin, Lucrezia (2011), Non-Standard 
Monetary Policy Measures And Monetary Developments, Brussels: ECB Working Paper 
Series No 1290 
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operations (TLTROs) aimed at increasing the liquidity of non-financial private 
actors40. 
Moreover, always in May 2009, the European Central Bank started a 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) allocating 60bn Euros to buy 
both private and state euro-denominated covered bonds issued by EAMS until 
June 2010. In November 2011 a second Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
was announced41. The second set of non-standard measures initiated by the 
ECB to react to the crisis, apart from the enhanced credit support measures, 
was the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) launched in May 2010 at the 
onset of the Greek crisis. The SMP allowed the Eurosystem to purchase both 
private and public euro area debt, however this could be done only in 
secondary markets, fully sterilised and up to a weekly limit, something that, 
instead of stopping market speculation, might have even stimulated it as by 
overcoming the weekly threshold just a bit they would beat the ECB and profit 
from speculation. In fact, only when Draghi announced on 6thSeptember 2012 
the replacement of the SMP by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), 
which eliminated any limits to the purchase of bonds in secondary market, the 
markets stopped going short on the sovereign debt of struggling countries. 
This happened more than two years speculation had started. In other words, it 
took more than two year to the ECB to act as a pseudo “lender of last resort” 
thus managing to put an end to market speculation against the sovereign debt 
of the PIIGS.  
Although the OMT as well were conditional to the implementation of 
strict austerity measures by Member states in needs, de facto this was not a 
problem as the OMT in practice did not need to be ever activated. To stop 
speculation it was enough for the markets to know that the ECB would buy 
every single bond sold by speculators, thus making profits impossible. This, in 
the opinion of the author of this article, and contrary to Chang and Leblond 
(2013) does not signal the start of any solidarity by EU institutions in favour of 
the weaker countries, but the redressing of an evident anomaly, that is not 
having a lender of last resort for the Euro-zone.  
Moreover, the austerity promoted to react to the sovereign debt crisis 
ended up in deflation, which signals the contraction of demand and, 
consequently, the contraction of profits. Also in this case the ECB intervened 
but, this time without much of a lag, with the quantitative easing (QE) 
programme inaugurated by the ECB on January 22, 2015. This meant putting 
60bn Euros into the system a month until at least September 2016 with the 
aim of stimulating growth and reversing deflation42. This form of intervention 
has been confirmed and increased to 80bn a month in March 201643. 
Regarding this it is important to note that, despite the fact the Euro-area 
had been in recession for quite some time, QE happened only when the 
spectre of deflation appeared all over Europe, and not before, when the 
                                                             
40 See ECB web-page 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html as accessed on January 
20, 2016 
41See ECB monetary policy  online, available athttp://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.htm as 
accessed on October 18th, 2012  
42 See BBC web-site http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30915210 as accessed on October 
22, 2015 
43 See Telegraph on line http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/03/10/ecbs-draghi-plays-
his-last-card-to-stave-off-deflation/ as accessed on March 21, 2016 
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burden of the global financial crisis was being shifted to the weaker countries 
and the weaker strata of the EU. Indeed it was precisely in 2015 that the HICP 
turned to 0 in the whole of the EU (see figure below). 
 
Figure -14: HICP Annual avg % Change European Union 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Conclusion: 
To conclude, conceptualising the crisis of the Euro-zone exclusively as a 
fiscal crisis might have led EU institutions to adopt inadequate policy and 
institutional measures. This contributed to further exacerbate the costs paid 
by the weakest countries of the system in terms of economic losses and 
imposition of though austerity programmes. This is very far from configuring 
that solidarity between the EU Member States often recalled in the literature 
which could only be achieved by the establishment of a true federalist fiscal 
system, a system that, at the moment, is not even at the stage of infancy.  
To be sure, the main feature of the EU approach to crisis management 
was austerity and ‘internal devaluation’, with all that this mean in terms of 
increasing inequalities both socially and geographically. This happened 
despite the rhetoric about the establishment of a new economic governance, 
or the renewed neo-functionalist credo in the progress towards more 
integration (Schimmelfennig 2014). As it might be expected this disciplinary 
attitude did provoke some popular discontent, political instability and 
disintegration threats whose seeds might produce further crises. 
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